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LEGISLATING SPECIAL RIGHTS
KAREN ENGLE1
Good morning. I’d like to thank the Cleveland-Marshall College of Law for
hosting this conference, and Tayyab Mahmud and Ratna Kapur for bringing us
together under the topic of sexual outlaws. I think we will learn an immense amount
today through the juxtaposition of work on sex workers and on sexual orientation.
I want to use local and national gay rights initiatives to ask the following
question: Is it possible to pursue a queer agenda in promoting and defending gay
rights ordinances? My answer is yes, or at least that we need to try to do it. I
propose that we pursue a queer agenda by arguing for special rights, not equal rights.
Not only does the special rights argument fit with the queer agenda; it also provides
our best hope for confronting gay rights opponents. Implicit in my call for special
rights is the assumption—based partly on the work of Janet Halley, Kendall Thomas
and others—that Romer v. Evans2 is a “thin” victory.
I’ll put forth my argument in the following way. First, I’ll talk about what a
queer sensibility is, and discuss how a call for special rights fits within that
sensibility. Second, I’ll look at the rhetoric that gay rights opponents use when they
argue against ordinances, initiatives and national laws protecting gay rights. As a
part of this discussion, I will explore what they mean when they use the term
“special rights.” Third, I’ll look at how proponents of gay rights talk about special
rights and study how, in responding to gay rights opponents, they often miss the
boat. Finally, I’ll talk about what it would be like to respond with a special rights
argument.
The Queer Sensibility
In his most recent book, The Trouble with Normal,3 queer theorist Michael
Warner explores ways that a “politics of sexual shame” has reduced the gay
movement to what he calls a “desexualized identity politics.” For him, the antithesis
of desexualized identity politics would be “[t]he frank refusal to repudiate sex or the
undignified people who have it, which I see as the tacit or explicit ethos in countless
scenes of queer culture.”4 Warner shows how the politics of sexual shame has
guided the post-gay position of Out Magazine’s editor James Collars, the new Gay
magazine Hero that states its explicit purpose is to get beyond sex and has taken out
any reference to sex and has no sex ads; the anti- or post-sexual politics of Larry
Kramer; and the near-universal embrace of same sex marriage campaign by gay
rights activists. For Warner, gay rights activists attempt to address social
stigmatization but not sexual shame, and they do so by portraying gay men, lesbians
and bisexuals as “normal.”
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Importantly, Warner argues that this politics of sexual shame is a shift in gay
politics, but not in queer culture. Rather, it represents a conscious choice by a few
to distinguish themselves as dignified, apart from the flaunters and others who make
them feel uncomfortable about their identity. It would be a mistake to see such
politics as the coming of age for the gay rights movement. For Warner, “[i]t is, in
effect, a takeover.” 5
Not surprisingly, many of those Warner critiques are lawyers. Our work in the
area of gay rights, it seems, has been liberal (read conservative). “Proper” legal
arguments and rights campaigns tend to shy away from descriptions of the “class”
that we represent. We make vague, if clever, arguments about equal protection, the
illegality of class stigmatization and maybe even the right to petition. Our cry that
we are everywhere suggests that we are okay. We’re in your schools, your
neighborhoods, your churches, and the military—and the important thing is you
haven’t even noticed. “We’re here, we’re queer, and we are not getting out of your
face” is no longer our rallying cry. Rather, we argue that we want equal rights just
like you, not special rights.
My intervention in the queer legal theory discourse has been to suggest that we
actually reverse the argument, and call for special rights, not equal rights. That
argument, I contend, is in line with Warner’s position. It does not focus on
normalcy— neither normalcy for queers nor for the society in which we live. Rather
it centers on the way that American culture through the regulation of our sexuality
has, in Justice Kennedy’s words in his majority opinion in Evans, made us “a
stranger to its laws.”6 It is because we have been singled out for special treatment
that we need special rights.
The Fear of “Special Rights” by Gay Rights Opponents
We need to abandon the “equal rights not special rights” slogan both because it
fails as a strategy to respond to gay rights opponents and because it has serious
negative implications for civil rights discourse. To illustrate this argument, I now
turn to how gay rights opponents use the term “special rights.” I glean from their use
of the term special rights four different meanings. Each meaning is outlined in detail
in my article, What’s so Special About Special Rights?,7 but I’ll just give you a few
examples here. The arguments can be divided into two main positions: 1) all civil
rights are special rights; and 2) gay rights are special rights because they give
homosexuals rights that others who are presumably similarly situated don’t have.
The first argument that all civil rights are special rights takes two forms. The
first form, which I call the overt argument, is most often seen in legislative debates
over the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (“ENDA”)8 and over local gay rights
ordinances. Judges rarely make the overt argument, probably because civil rights
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law is fairly entrenched in the law. To give you an example of this type of argument,
I’ll read from Senator Ashcroft’s statement against ENDA:
But I remember a situation when I was Governor of Missouri in which
one man operating a laundry fired a black woman from the laundry. She
was one of seven black women working in the laundry. She was replaced
by a black woman. But she sued alleging that she was fired because she
was discriminated against on the basis of both race and sex.
The truth of the matter is that the establishment of protected classes makes
much more difficult the ability of anyone to even use good judgment in
hiring and firing because there is always the threat of litigation.9
Basically, for Senator Ashcroft, civil rights law has made life very tough for
employers. Adding to the civil rights corpus would only exacerbate the already
negative consequences of antidiscrimination law.
The second form of the argument, which is related to the first, is a bit more
subtle. While the first form suggests that all civil rights are special rights and
therefore bad, this form asserts that, regardless whether special rights are justified in
other civil rights contexts, we certainly don’t want them with regard to gay rights.
My examples of this argument are Justice Scalia’s dissent in Evans and Judge
Krupansky’s majority opinion in Equality Foundation Inc. v. City of Cincinnati.10
Those familiar with the Cincinnati case and the difference that the Sixth Circuit drew
or tried to draw between the Colorado Amendment and the Cincinnati Initiative
know that much of the debate was over whether the new laws denied gay, lesbian
and bisexual citizens the protection of general laws or whether they merely denied
them special rights. The Cincinnati Charter Amendment is itself a good example of
this conflation of civil rights and special rights. The amendment prohibited giving
homosexuals, lesbian or bisexuals “any claim of minority or protected status, quota
preference or other preferential treatment.”11 I don’t read “or preferential treatment”
here to refer only to quotas but to refer to any claim of minority or protected status.
In this form of the argument, then, all civil rights are special rights, but they are
particularly bad in the case of gay rights.
The second major argument against special rights assumes that gay rights are
special rights because they give gay men, lesbians and bisexuals protection that other
groups don’t have. This argument is also made in two forms. The first is that gay
rights are special because they grant homosexuals rights based on conduct. The
second assumes that the ordinances prohibiting discrimination based on sexual
orientation and ENDA grant special rights to homosexuals and bisexuals by
protecting them, but not heterosexuals, from discrimination. The first form of this
argument appears in Justice Scalia’s dissent in Evans. He bases much of that opinion
on a distinction between status and conduct. In the opinion Justice Scalia critiques
the regulation of the American Association of Law Schools that requires member
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schools to prohibit employers that discriminate based on sexual orientation from
interviewing on campus. Justice Scalia suggests that these same employers are free
“to refuse to offer a job because the applicant is a Republican; because he is an
adulterer; because he went to the wrong prep school or belongs to the wrong country
club; because he eats snails; because he is a womanizer; because [and this is the only
time the student is a she] she wears real-animal fur; or even because he hates the
Chicago Cubs.”12 I think that Justice Scalia sees all of these examples he gives as
related to conduct. The idea is that if homosexuality is defined by the conduct, then
giving homosexuals rights would be treating them differently from snail-eaters and
fur-wearers. Such different treatment would constitute special treatment.
The second form of the argument that gay rights give homosexuals rights that
others don’t have assumes that anti-discrimination ordinances only prohibit
discrimination against gay men and lesbians and maybe bisexuals. This argument is
a bit odd given that the ordinances and ENDA make it clear that they prohibit
discrimination based on the classification of sexual orientation. Moreover, it seems
that regardless of the purpose for passing anti-discrimination laws, they are often
used to protect majorities as well as minorities. Despite the clarity of the language in
the ordinances, and in ENDA, and despite the history of the interpretation of
antidiscrimination laws, the argument continues to be made. Again an example
comes from Senator Ashcroft’s argument against ENDA: “We should be wary of
telling young people that . . . you can sue someone for failing to hire you if you can
allege that you are a homosexual—you will not be able to do that if you have
ordinary sexual orientation.”13
The gist of all of these arguments is that gay rights proponents have not justified
the need for special rights, or rights that are guaranteed to other protected classes.
For Justice Scalia, in particular, the question is why sexual orientation should be
treated more like race than like snail-eating and fur-wearing. Of course, because of
the negative meaning that is attached to special rights, the conflation of all civil
rights with special rights represents a general entrenchment in civil rights law. Gay
rights advocates need to be careful about how we respond to that conflation, which
leads me to the third part of my talk.
The Fear of Special Rights by Gay Rights Proponents
The response by gay rights activists to the special rights critique has often only
added to the retrenchment of civil rights discourse and law. Moreover, the advocacy
fails to respond to the call for justification. Advocacy on behalf of ENDA provides
an example of this failure. Two main arguments are perenially made on behalf of
this legislation. The first is business efficiency. The argument seems to be that
homosexuals are good, normal and dignified workers, and it is in the interest of the
country to protect them. For me, one of the problems with this argument is not only
that it is assimilationist, but also that it has a xenophobic hue. I’ll read to you from
Senator Kennedy’s comments on behalf of ENDA: “Job discrimination is not only
un-American—it is counterproductive. It excludes qualified individuals, lowers
12
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workplace productivity, and hurts us all. For the nation to compete effectively in a
global economy, we have to use all our available talent, and create a work
environment where everyone can excel.”14 So the thrust of this position seems to be
that it is better to hire gays and lesbians than to let those jobs and the competitive
advantage go to foreigners.
The second argument that is often given by gay rights advocates revolves around
an insistence that we don’t want special rights anyway. We don’t want affirmative
action. We don’t want domestic partnership benefits. We don’t want anything
“special” or “preferential.” At least with regard to ENDA, advocates have made it
very clear that they aren’t asking for any of those things. In fact, President Clinton
wrote to the Senate Labor Committee in his letter—I think it is important to
emphasize—in support of ENDA: “[Y]our bill specifically prohibits preferential
treatment on the basis of sexual orientation, including quotas. It also does not
require employers to provide special benefits.”15 These sentiments are echoed
throughout pro-ENDA testimony, buying into the idea that affirmative action or
preferential treatment is bad, at least for “normal” people. In fact, the bill has now
been amended specifically to prohibit affirmative action. This attitude toward
affirmative action has consequences for other struggles over affirmative action by
suggesting that affirmative action is negative.
Arguing for Special Rights
Now I turn to my fourth and final part, which is to suggest that we really need to
provide a thick description of our lives and of the discrimination we face when
arguing on behalf of gay rights ordinances and also against their repeal. An obvious
justification for prohibiting discrimination against a group would be that such
discrimination is widespread, unlike the discrimination against fur-wearers and snaileaters. It is surprising, though, that in ENDA advocacy and advocacy for local
ordinances, there is little discussion about the discrimination that gay men and
lesbians face. We should talk about such discrimination, but we should do so in a
way that doesn’t just focus on victimization. That is, we need to assert our own
understanding of pleasure and desire. One of the reasons we tend not to talk about
discrimination or to assert queer identities, I think, is because we often push these
ordinances as decent, normalizing remedies. Indeed, advocates often point to the
little impact such laws are likely to make. ENDA advocates, for example, use data
from states with antidiscrimination laws that include sexual orientation to show how
rarely claims are brought.
Rather than insisting that the legislation is unremarkable, I would urge gay rights
advocates to address the potentially radical impact of the bill on the legal subjectivity
of gay men and lesbians. Janet Halley gives us one way of doing that by contrasting
the thin description of homosexuality given by the Evans majority with what she sees
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as the thick description set forth by the majority in Bowers v. Hardwick.16 She notes:
“The claim that ‘sodomy’ is ‘the behavior that defines the class’ implies a thick
description of sexual orientation categories, and has precipitated a series of legal
struggles to control their description and thus the legal understanding of the real
people inhabiting them.”17 While Hardwick “frankly acknowledg[es] its textual
character by inviting its audience to become engaged in reading it”—and to be
presumably disgusted by it—the Evans majority, she says, suppresses “this intense,
and tense, relationship between the text and its readers. It invites us to forget
ourselves in a way that Hardwick does not.”18 It could be said, I think, that gay
rights advocates follow the same course as the Evans majority by refusing to
confront the very issues that guide the debate about whether sexual orientation
should be a protected classification. Two of these issues Halley describes are sex
and hate. I would suggest that those provide a good place to start.
Gay rights advocates should seize the opportunity through public debate, whether
surrounding ENDA, local ordinances or other law reform projects, to counter the
thick description of homosexuality that equates it with the moral reprehensibility,
which the conservatives have successfully propagated. And I think the way to do
that is to begin to argue for special rights. Lest you think I’m way out there, let me
suggest that special rights are not a radical idea when we’re talking about the rights
of corporations, property owners, and married people. Indeed, Oliver Wendell
Holmes gave us a good idea over one hundred years ago about what special rights
might be. For him:
Every right is a consequence attached by the law to one or more facts
which the law defines, and wherever the law gives any one special rights
not shared by the body of the people, it does so on the ground that certain
special facts, not true of the rest of the world, are true of him.19
The question gay rights advocates should address is not whether we are
advocating for equal rights or special rights, but why gay men and lesbians need
special rights. Even with the absence of antigay initiatives, the state makes
homosexuals strangers to the law. Because of these facts, homosexuals are in need
of special rights. It’s time to admit it.
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